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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In re Adoption of: 
Baby Boy Vedadi 
Case No. 20000449CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-3(2) (h) (2000) . 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Addendum A for text of pertinent statutes, rules, 
and constitutional provisions. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1: Does Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii) of the 
Utah Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution because it makes the rights of biological 
fathers, but not mothers, conditional upon payment of birth 
1 
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and pregnancy-related expenses? Standard of Review: Gender-
based classifications "will survive equal protection 
scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a 
legitimate state interest." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 
91 (1982). Preservation: (R. 308-311). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Does Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii) of the 
Utah Code violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution because it terminates the parental rights of 
certain classes of unwed fathers, and not other classes of 
unwed fathers, although there is no practical difference 
between the classes of unwed fathers? Standard of Review: 
Legislation is presumed valid and will be sustained on an 
equal protection challenge if the classification drawn by 
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 
U.S. 432 (1985). Preservation: (R. 308-311). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Does Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii) of the 
Utah Code violate the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution because it terminates the parental 
rights of biological fathers who have made their identity 
2 
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known, and taken substantial steps to demonstrate an 
interest in and commitment to their child, prior to the 
child's birth? Standard of Review: The due process clause 
of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
the government to infringe fundamental liberty interests at 
all, no matter what process is provided, unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1976). Preservation: (R. 308-311). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Does Section 78-30-4.14 (2) (b) (iii) of the 
Utah Code violate the Due Process Clauses of the Utah 
Constitution since this provision deprived Hartwig of his 
parental rights although he had made his identity known 
prior to the child's birth, and taken substantial steps to 
demonstrate his commitment to his child? Standard of 
Review: The parental interest is a fundamental right to be 
invaded only to the extent necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest. In re JP, 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 
1982). Preservation: (R. 308-311). 
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ISSUE NO. 5: Is Section 78-30-4 .14 (2) (b) (iii) of the 
Utah Code unconstitutionally vague? Standard of Review: 
" [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of 
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential part of due 
process of law." Connally v. General Construction Co., 2 69 
U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Preservation: (R. 308-311). 
ISSUE NO. 6: Did the trial court err when it ruled that 
Hartwig failed to comply with Section U.C.A. § 78-30-
4.14(2) (b) (iii)? Standard of Review: "When reviewing a 
bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, the trial 
court's judgment must be sustained unless it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or [unless] the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made." State v. Layman, 953 P. 2d 782, 
786 (Ut.Ct.App. 1998). Preservation: This issue was the 
subject of a bench trial on June 23, 1999. 
4 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Hartwig is the unwed biological father of Baby 
Boy Vedadi, who was born on February 14, 1999. The 
biological mother, Ms. Wendy Vedadi, placed the baby for 
adoption 24 hours after his birth, and Hartwig filed a 
Motion to Enjoin and Dismiss the Petition for Adoption on 
the grounds that he had complied with all of the 
requirements set forth in Section 78-30-4.14 of the Utah 
Code (governing the rights of biological fathers to block 
the adoption of their children by third parties). Section 
78-30-4.14 provides that Mr. Hartwig1s son may be adopted 
by third parties without his consent unless he strictly 
complied with the three provisions set forth in Section 78-
30-4.14(2)(b). 
On June 23, 1999, the trial court entered an order 
declaring that Hartwig properly and timely complied with 
the first two provisions of that section by filing a Notice 
and Petition for Paternity prior to the baby's birth. In 
July of 1999, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
entered an order stating that Hartwig had not strictly 
complied with Section 78-30-4.14 (2) (b) (iii) and that his 
consent was therefore not required to the adoption of 
5 
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child. The court's order effectively terminated Hartwig's 
parental rights with respect to his infant son. On May 1, 
2000, the trial court entered an order denying Hartwig's 
Motion to Hold Section 78-30-4 .14 (2) (b) (iii) of the Utah 
Code Unconstitutional. Hartwig filed a Notice of Appeal on 
May 25, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Scott Hartwig met Wendy Vedadi in January of 1998. (R. 
451 at pages 32:6-14, 205). Vedadi was the mother of four 
children, ages 7, 11, 14 and 18 months (R. 451 at p. 
105:14-23). Hartwig was 33 years old (R. 451 at p. 1-11), 
and did not have any children of his own (R. 451 at p. 
39:2-7). When Hartwig met Vedadi, he was employed full time 
at a garden shop and involved in Softball during much of 
his free time. (Addendum F, Affidavit of Scott Hartwig). 
Hartwig often took Vedadi and her children to his weekly 
Softball games. (R. 451 at pages 18-22, 116:11-24). Hartwig 
and Vedadi became engaged in approximately May of 1999. (R. 
451 at p. 32:15-20). 
Soon after they became engaged, Vedadi informed Hartwig 
that she was pregnant with his child. (R. 451 at p. 34:7-
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11). Hartwig was elated to learn that he would be a father. 
(R. 451 at pages 32:22-25, 33:1-2, 34:7-22, 45:P-1). 
Hartwig immediately called his family and friends to report 
the good news about Vedadi' s pregnancy. (R. 451 at pages 
35:5-14, 119:23-25, 120:1-14). Hartwig attended a doctor's 
appointment with Vedadi in July of 1999. (R. 451 at pages 
19-24, 148:9-14). During that appointment, Hartwig listened 
to the baby's heartbeat. (R. 39 at 2-7). After learning of 
the pregnancy, Hartwig began purchasing diapers and other 
items for the baby. (R. 451 at pages 50:1-18, 52:8-23, 
384:9). Hartwig and Vedadi also picked a name for the baby: 
Justice Reade Hartwig. (R. 451, P. 38:4-18). 
The relationship between Vedadi and Hartwig was rocky 
from the beginning, and the couple broke up and reconciled 
several times between May and October of 1999. (R. 451 at 
pages 33:7-10, 35:22-25, 37:22-25, 42:3-10, 49:15-17, 
169:14-16). After a breakup in July of 1998, Vedadi 
threatened Hartwig for the first time that she was going to 
give their baby up for adoption. (R. 451 at p. 89:4-11). 
Hartwig realized that he might be solely responsible for 
the baby, and made a list of things to do, including "save 
money for doctor bills (1/2)" and "get insurance for me, 
7 
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baby, and Wendy," and "set up baby's bedroom." (R. 451 at 
67:18-25, 68:1-25, p. 450, Exhibit P-6). 
Hartwig did not have medical insurance for himself 
when he found out that Vedadi was pregnant. (R. 451 at p. 
77:11-13, 79:12-20). Hartwig made inquiries, but was unable 
to obtain medical insurance for Vedadi through his employer 
after he learned Vedadi was pregnant. (R. 451 at p. 193:6-
14).1 Vedadi had already been receiving Medicaid for her 
other children prior to her relationship with Hartwig, (R. 
451 at p. 167:20-23, 191:1-11), and after learning that she 
was pregnant, she applied to extend that coverage to her 
pregnancy. (R. 451 at 190-191). Ultimately, Medicaid paid 
for the expenses of Vedadifs pregnancy and birth, except 
for a few office visits at the beginning of the pregnancy. 
(R. 451 at pages 157:15-25, 158:1-16). 
In October of 1998, Vedadi broke off their relationship 
permanently. (R. 451 at pages 51:1-10, 52:24-25, 53:1-12). 
At that time, Vedadi again told Hartwig that she intended 
to give their child up for adoption. (R. 451 at pages 55:2-
16) . Vedadi was adamant in her desire to end the 
1
 Hartwig asks this Court to take judicial notice of the 
fact that private insurance companies will not issue a new 
policy for medical benefits on a woman who is pregnant at 
the time of applying for coverage. 
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relationship, and Hartwig acquiesced. (R. 451 at p. 53:1-
12). When Hartwig went to pick up his belongings from 
Vedadifs home, Vedadi included among HartwigTs belongings 
certain items such as maternity clothes, that Hartwig had 
purchased for Vedadi. (R. 451 at 51:4-25, 52:1-5, 161:16-
25). Vedadi told Hartwig that she would not return his 
phone calls in the future, (R. 451 at p. 184:5-10), because 
Vedadi considered Hartwig1s assertions that he wanted to 
keep his baby and would do whatever necessary to prevent 
the adoption, as "threats." (R. 451 at page 184:5-22). 
Hartwig tried to call Vedadi several times in November and 
December, but she would not accept nor return his calls. 
(R. 450 at pages 53:3-25, 54:1-23, 182:19-25, 183:1-5, 
184:1-10, 204:6-19, 241:4-19). 
Vedadi testified that she purchased some diapers for 
the baby at the beginning of her pregnancy, (R. 451, P. 
171-172), but did not buy anything else for the baby 
throughout her pregnancy. (R. 451, P. 171:21-25, P. 172:1-
4). She testified that she spent a total of "a couple of 
hundred dollars" for costs relating to her pregnancy. (R. 
172-173). 
9 
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Shortly after the October breakup, Hartwig contacted 
Utah Department of Recovery Services, to ask what he could 
do regarding Vedadi's threats to give the baby up for 
adoption. (R. 451 at pages 56-57). The person with whom he 
spoke assured Hartwig that some forms would be sent to 
Hartwig, and instructed Hartwig to fill the forms out and 
return them. (R. 451 at p. 57:8-23, 80:12-22). Hartwig 
filled the forms out, named himself as the father, and gave 
all of the information requested regarding his own assets 
and employment. (R. 450, Form Entitled "Parents Background 
Information"). Hartwig testified that he believed the form 
served the purpose of identifying himself as the baby's 
father, naming himself as the responsible party for the 
medical expenses, and asserting his interest in obtaining 
custody of the baby. (R. 451 at p. 58:2-8, 79:21-25, 80:1-
5) . Where the form asked if the father had completed a 
"Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity," Hartwig made a 
handwritten note, saying, "Isn't this one?" (R. 450, Form 
Entitled "Parents Background Information"). 
From October of 1999 up until the baby's birth, Hartwig 
purchased baby furniture, clothing, diapers, and various 
other supplies. (R. 451 at pages 63:4-25, 64:1-6, 114:9-
10 
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13) . In fact, he completely furnished an entire nursery for 
the baby at his apartment. (R. 451 at pages 66:2-16, see 
also Addenda F and G). Hartwig made inquiries regarding 
medical insurance for the baby, but was told that he could 
not enroll the baby without information regarding his 
birth, social security number, etc. (R. 451 at pages 
104:13-23, 109:1-17). From October until the baby's birth, 
Hartwig constantly expressed his concern for his unborn 
child to friends and family. (R. 451, pages 121, 240:3-10). 
A little after December 15, 1998, the Recovery Services 
form that Hartwig had filled out was returned to him in the 
mail, along with a note stating that Utah Recovery Services 
did not deal with custody issues. (R. 450, Exhibit P-3). 
After that, Hartwig started making telephone calls to 
various agencies, including Vedadifs doctors and the 
hospital where he believed his child would be born. (R. 451 
at p. 6-16). In January of 1999, Hartwig began searching 
for an attorney, and retained counsel in early-January. (R. 
451 at p. 1- 18). 
On January 16, 1998, Hart wig sent letters, through his 
attorney, to Vedadifs medical providers, naming himself as 
the responsible party and asking that medical bills be sent 
11 
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directly to him. (R. 450, Exhibits P-4 and P-5, R. 452 at 
pages 61:1-25, 62:1-12). On January 20, 1999, Hartwig filed 
a Complaint for Paternity with the Third District Court. 
(See Addendum E) . Vedadi was personally served with the 
Complaint for Paternity on January 20, 1999. (R. 111). On 
January 25, 1999, Hartwig filed a "Notice of Commencement 
of Paternity Proceedings," with the Utah Department of 
Vital Statistics (R. 49) . Along with his Complaint for 
Paternity, Hartwig filed an affidavit stating his desire 
and ability to obtain custody of his child, and expressing 
his willingness to submit to a court order requiring him to 
pay his share of expenses related to the pregnancy and 
birth. (See Addendum G). 
On February 14, Vedadi gave birth to a baby boy. The 
next day, Vedadi relinquished her own parental rights and 
gave her consent to the baby being adopted by Marc and 
Genevieve Greeley. (R. 24). The baby was immediately turned 
over to the custody of the Greeleys. (R. 33).2 In March of 
1999, DNA testing was conducted, and Hartwig1s paternity of 
the baby was confirmed. (R. 108-109) . On March 26, 1999, 
2
 Vedadi also relinquished custody of her 2-year-old 
daughter Hope to the Greeleys, although Hope had lived in 
the Vedadi's home since birth with Vedadi's other 
children. (R. 33). 
12 
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Hartwig filed a Petition to Enjoin and Dismiss Adoption 
Proceedings and a Motion For Temporary Order requesting 
temporary custody. (R. 41-60). 
In April and May of 1999, Hartwig voluntarily underwent 
a psychological evaluation for the purpose of providing 
information to the court in support of his request for 
unsupervised visitation. (R.209-213). The psychologist's 
report indicated that Hartwig1s test scores indicated that 
he had "superior parenting knowledge and capacity." (R. 
211) . 
In June of 1999, Adoption Associates conducted a 
thorough study of Hartwig and his home. (R. 204-207). That 
study indicated that Hartwig has no criminal record 
whatsoever, and no history of abuse or neglect of children. 
(R. 206) . Collateral references, many of whom had used 
Hartwig as a babysitter, confirmed that Hartwig was 
"affectionate, patient, calm, happy, easy going, playful 
with children, and calm." (R. 206). One reference 
expressed, "Hartwig is the most prepared for a new baby 
that I have ever seen anyone be. Any child would be lucky 
to receive his love and care." (R. 206). The social worker 
concluded: "Hartwig appears unusual in his motivation to 
13 
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gain custody of his child. He appears to be responsible and 
capable of making the sacrifices necessary to care for his 
child. He appears to enjoy children and is often used to 
babysit his friends1 children. He is financially 
responsible, and his work allows him the flexibility needed 
to meet the needs of his child. His health is good. The 
apartment where he lives is adequate for a child, and he 
has made extensive preparations to provide the clothes, 
equipment, and accessories needed to care for a child. 
There appears to be no reason why Hartwig should not 
receive custody." (R. 207-208). 
In June of 1999, Hartwig sent a money order for 
$1,000.00 to the Greeley's, through their attorney, for 
partial reimbursement of expenses related to pregnancy and 
birth. (R. 450, Letter Dated June 5, 1999; Copy of Money 
Order) . 
From April to July, 1999, Hartwig was permitted to 
exercise supervised visitation with his son for several 
hours each week. (R. 260- 263) . Hartwig took care of the 
baby, played with him, and formed a very strong bond with 
the baby. (R. 262, 265-267). A pediatric nurse who observed 
the visitations described Hartwig as very loving, gentle, 
14 
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and patient with his son. (R. 255-258). Even the 
supervisors selected by the Greeleys observed that Hartwig 
was patient, competent, and loving with his son. (R. 269-
274). Hartwig paid approximately $600.00 per month to 
Willwin Services for their services in supervising the 
visitation. (R. 260). 
In July of 1999, this court entered an order stating 
that Hartwig had not strictly complied with Section 78-30-
4.14(2) (b) (iii) and that his consent was therefore not 
required to the adoption of child. The court's order 
effectively terminated Hartwig's parental rights with 
respect to his infant son. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's current adoption statute, which was adopted in 
1995, imposes new and additional requirements upon unwed 
biological fathers who wish to prevent the adoption of 
their children by third parties. These new provisions have 
not yet been reviewed by an appellate court in Utah. 
Previous versions of the adoption statute required 
biological fathers to register their claim of paternity 
with the Utah Department of Health, or forever waive their 
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rights to prevent the adoption of their offspring. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (3) (a) (d) (Supp. 1975). The new version 
of the statute requires that an unwed father not only file 
a petition for paternity and custody, along with an 
affidavit stating his willingness to accept financial 
responsibility for his child, but also that a father " [pay] 
a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in 
connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's 
birth, in accordance with his means, and when not prevented 
from doing so by the person or authorized agency having 
lawful custody of the child." Utah Code Ann. 78-30-
4.14 (2) (b) (iii) (1999) . 
Section 78-30-4.14(2) (b) (iii) violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because 
it imposes a "financial responsibility test" on fathers 
based solely on gender, when there are no inherent 
differences based on gender which make women more likely 
than men to assume financial responsibility for their 
children. Additionally, Section 4.14 improperly 
discriminates between various classes of unwed biological 
fathers, allowing some unwed fathers to establish paternity 
by merely filing a simple form jointly with the mother, 
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while requiring others to prove that they have paid birth-
and pregnancy-related expenses. Furthermore, the state's 
asserted interests in providing for speedy finalization of 
adoptions is not promoted, but in fact undermined, by 
Section 78-30-4 .14 (2) (b) (iii) . 
Section 78-30-4 .14 (2) (b) (iii) violates Due Process 
Clause of the Utah and United States Constitutions because 
it deprives Hartwig of his parental rights, although 
Hartwig's identity and paternity were established, and 
Hartwig had shown a significant paternal interest in his 
child. Furthermore, the state's interest in promptly 
finalizing adoptions is not promoted, but in fact 
undermined, by Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii). 
Finally, the trial court erroneously determined that 
Scott Hartwig did not comply with Section 78-30-
4.14(2) (b) (iii), although Hartwig made substantial 
expenditures for his child's benefit, named himself as the 
responsible party with medical providers and the Utah 
Office of Recovery Services, and was never informed of 
expenses or billed for medical expenses in spite of his 
requests. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii) of the Utah Code Violates 
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution. 
a. Utah' s Adoption Statute Is Based Upon an Improper 
Gender-Based Distinction. 
Utah's Adoption Statute mandates that unwed biological 
fathers have no right to block the adoption of their 
children unless they first demonstrate that they have paid 
their fair share of expenses related to pregnancy and 
birth. Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.14 (2) (B) (iii) (1999) . Unwed 
biological mothers may block the adoption of their children 
without demonstrating the same thing. Utah Code Ann. 78-30-
4 .14 (1) (c) (1999) . Thus, the applicability of Section 78-30-
4.14 (2) (b) (iii) depends on the gender of the biological 
parent. 
"Gender-based distinctions must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives in order to withstand 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. " Caban v. 
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Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979)(quoting Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). 
In Caban, the Supreme Court held that a state law which 
prevented an unwed biological father from contesting the 
adoption of his children under any circumstances violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court explained that the 
provision did not bear a substantial relationship to the 
state's professed interest of providing adoptive homes for 
illegitimate children — because unwed biological fathers 
were no more likely to impede adoption than unwed mothers. 
The court noted that while there are inherent differences 
between men and women such that the mother's identity and 
location is always known, while the father's often is not, 
"the effect of New York's classification is to discriminate 
against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and 
they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the 
child." Id. at 1760. The Caban court rejected "the 
harshness of classifying unwed fathers as being invariably 
less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a 
concerned judgment as to the fate of their children." Id. 
at 1760. 
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Utah's statute is admittedly different from the statute 
in Caban because Utah's statute does not prevent all unwed 
biological fathers from blocking the adoption of their 
children. Nevertheless, 78-30-4 .14 (2) (b) (iii) does operate 
to prevent many biological fathers from blocking the 
adoption of their children — "even when their identity is 
known and they have manifested a significant paternal 
interest in the child." Caban at 1760. The provision must 
therefore "serve important governmental objectives and must 
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives 
in order to withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause." Caban. 
The state objectives underlying this provision are set 
forth expressly in Section 78-30-4.12, which provides that 
"the state has a compelling interest in providing stable 
and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt 
manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive 
placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting 
the needs of children." The Utah Supreme Court has already 
determined that these general goals are indeed important 
government objectives. See Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 
681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984). Thus, the question here is 
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whether the classification created by the statute is 
"substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 
Caban at 388-89. 
In Wells the Utah Supreme Court confirmed the 
constitutionality of a provision of Utah's adoption statute 
which required biological fathers, but not mothers, to 
simply file a notice of claim of parenthood in order to 
protect their right to contest the adoption of their 
children. The Wells court explained the substantial 
relationship between the paternity registration requirement 
and the state's interests, as follows: 
It is vitally important to know finally and 
immediately if a newborn illegitimate child may be 
adopted. The statute seeks to balance the 
competing interests of the child and the putative 
father by first, identifying the person who 
acknowledges paternity and the resultant 
responsibilities, and second, if such 
identification does not occur, allowing for speedy 
adoption. 
Wells at 204. Thus, the Wells court recognized that the 
inherent difference between women and men with regards to 
identification and proof of parenthood justified the 
differential treatment in that case because the 
differential treatment was reasonably calculated to advance 
the state's interest in having adoption of eligible 
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children take place in a speedy manner. Id. The court 
explained that the state's important goal of having 
adoptions be finalized quickly is undermined if agencies 
and mothers are required to make efforts to identify 
fathers who have not come forward — or if such fathers are 
allowed to come forward later rather than sooner. Id. 
In contrast, the differential treatment based on gender 
embodied in Section 78-30-4 .14 (2) (A) (iii) is unrelated to 
the inherent differences between men and women with regards 
to identification and proof of parenthood. Biological 
fathers who have timely registered their claim of paternity 
and their willingness to be legally and financially 
responsible for their children are nevertheless required to 
also prove that they have paid their share of pregnancy and 
birth-related expenses (within 24 hours of the child's 
birth) or lose their parental rights forever. 
Furthermore, this requirement, unlike the paternity 
registration requirement, is not reasonably calculated to 
advance the state's purported interests. First, the state 
has asserted an interest in promptly knowing if a father 
will assert his rights, so that adoption of eligible 
children can proceed promptly. While paternity registration 
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requirements allow a prompt and immediate determination as 
to whether an adoption may go forward, Section 78-30-
4.14(2) (b) (iii) requires a complicated factual inquiry in 
every case as to the father's means, the amount and nature 
of pregnancy and birth-related expenses, what would 
constitute the father's "fair share" of such expenses, and 
whether the father was prevented from paying by someone 
having custody of the child. Thus, instead of promoting a 
prompt and final determination as to the eligibility of a 
child for adoption, this provision invites litigation and 
delay in every case where the father's rights turn on this 
particular provision. 
Moreover, the state asserts an admittedly valid 
interest in preventing disruption of adoptive placements. 
However, this goal is not advanced either, but instead also 
undermined by the requirements of Section 78-30-
4.14(2)(b)(iii) — because adoptive placements will not 
become permanent until the complex factual determinations 
required by the provision, and the inevitable litigation 
regarding the same, are complete. 
Finally, the state has asserted an interest in "holding 
parents accountable for meeting the needs of children." If 
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the state's interest is in promoting or determining the 
financial responsibility of biological parents, there is no 
reason why this requirement should be imposed on unwed 
biological fathers and not unwed biological mothers. 
Although there is admittedly an inherent difference between 
men and woman when it comes identity and proof of 
parenthood, there is no inherent difference when it comes 
to financial responsibility. At any rate, the state's 
asserted interest is expressly gender neutral (i.e. the 
state seeks to hold "parents" accountable, not just 
fathers) — and thus cannot justify a provision which treats 
parents differently based on gender. 
In sum, the requirement that hinges the parental rights 
of unwed biological fathers, but not mothers, on payment of 
pregnancy and birth-related expenses is not justified by 
inherent differences between mothers and fathers, and is 
not substantially related to the state's asserted 
interests. Furthermore, like the statute in Caban, "the 
effect of [the state's] classification is to discriminate 
against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and 
they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the 
child." Id. at 1760. Thus, Section 78-30-4.14 (2) (b) (iii) 
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violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14 Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution. 
b. Utah's Adoption Statute Is Based Upon an 
Improper Distinction Between Various Classes of 
Unwed Biological Fathers. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, even a general 
classification which results in differential treatment of 
similarly situated parties must be "rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).3 Utah's Adoption Statute 
mandates significantly distinct treatment of different 
classes of biological fathers with regards to their 
3
 Hartwig argues here that the discriminatory treatment 
of the various classes of unwed biological fathers is not 
"rationally related" to "a legitimate government interest." 
However, if this Court finds that Hartwig manifested a 
significant paternal interest in his infant son, and thus 
developed a fundamental right with regards to that 
relationship, see e.g. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 
(1983), then this classification should be subjected to a 
"strict scrutiny" test since it operates to deprive Hartwig 
of a fundamental right. See e.g. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 383, 388 (1978) (classification causing 
impediment to marriage restricts fundamental right and is 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny). In that that case, 
the classification is required to be "narrowly tailored" to 
a "compelling government interest." Id. Clearly, where, as 
argued here, the classification is not even rationally 
related to the asserted interests it purports to advance, 
it is not narrowly tailored to the advancement of those 
interests. 
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parental rights. The statute provides that the following 
three classes of unwed biological fathers may block the 
adoption of their children by withholding their consent: 
(1) . . . 
(a) . . . 
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to 
be the child's biological father by a court of 
competent jurisdiction prior to the other's 
execution of her consent or her relinquishment to 
an agency for adoption; 
(e) any biological parent who has executed a voluntary 
declaration of paternity in accordance with Title 
78, Chapter 45e, prior to the mother's execution of 
her consent or her relinquishment to an agency for 
adoption; 
(f) an unmarried father . . . if [all of following 
requirements are met prior to the mother's 
execution of her consent or her relinquishment to 
an agency for adoption]: 
(2)(b)(i) [the father has] initiated [judicial] 
proceedings to establish paternity . . . and 
filed with that court a sworn affidavit 
stating that he is fully able and willing to 
have full custody of the child, setting forth 
his plans for care of the child, and agreeing 
to a court order of child support and the 
payment of expenses incurred in connection 
with the mother's pregnancy and the child's 
birth; 
(ii) the father has] filed notice of the 
commencement of paternity proceedings with the 
state registrar of vital statistics within the 
Department of Health in a confidential 
registry established by the department for 
that purpose; and 
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(iii) if the father had actual knowledge of the 
pregnancy, [he must have] paid a fair and 
reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in 
connection with the mother's pregnancy and 
child's birth, in accordance with his means, 
and when not prevented form doing so by the 
person or authorized agency having lawful 
custody of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.14 (1999). The first class of 
unwed biological fathers described above may preserve their 
parental rights by obtaining a judicial adjudication of 
paternity. Since mothers are permitted to relinquish their 
children for adoption 24 hours after birth pursuant to 
Section 78-30-4.19, this method of preserving parental 
rights is simply not available to biological fathers in 
newborn adoptions unless the mother stipulates to paternity 
(since adjudication of a paternity complaint would 
necessarily take several months). 
The second class of biological fathers may preserve 
their parental rights by simply executing a "voluntary 
declaration of paternity," a simple one-page document. 
Importantly, a biological father may only execute a 
voluntary declaration of paternity jointly with the 
biological mother. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45e-3 (1999). 
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Finally, there is a third class of unwed biological 
fathers of which Hartwig is a member. These fathers must 
file a Notice of Paternity with the Department of Health, 
and also a Complaint for Paternity and Custody in the 
courts. The complaint for Paternity and Custody must be 
accompanied by an affidavit in which the father 
acknowledges his willingness to support his child and to 
pay all expenses related to the pregnancy and birth. These 
documents must be executed and filed before the mother 
executes her consent to adoption — often within 24 hours of 
the child's birth. 
Having established the classification system embodied 
in Utah's Adoption Statute, an analysis under the equal 
protection clause requires an inquiry into the asserted 
state interest underlying the classification, and the 
relationship between the classification and the asserted 
interest. Section 78-30-4.12 expressly provides that "the 
state has a compelling interest in providing stable and 
permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, 
in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements, and in 
holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of 
children." These are admittedly legitimate state interests, 
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so the question becomes whether the classification created 
by the statute has a "rational relationship" to the 
interest asserted by the state. City of Cleburne at 446. 
"The term 'rational' . . . includes a requirement that 
an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the 
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that 
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged 
class." Id. (J. Stevens, concurring). Furthermore, "[t]he 
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship 
to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary or irrational." City of Cleburne at 
446 (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 6163 (1982)). 
In Utah's Adoption Statute, there is no apparent 
difference between the three classes of fathers which would 
justify requiring proof of payment of pregnancy and birth-
related expenses from the third class of biological 
fathers. In fact, the third class of biological fathers 
necessarily become a member of that class, not because of 
any difference in their commitment to their children, but 
either because not enough time has passed to obtain a 
judicial adjudication of paternity (without the mother's 
consent), or because the biological mother will not jointly 
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execute the declaration of paternity. Thus, the primary and 
perhaps only difference between the fathers in the first 
two classes, and the fathers in the third class is whether 
the mother herself is willing to cooperate with the 
father's efforts to establish his paternity. 
There is nothing about the first two classes of fathers 
which supports the premise that they would be more likely 
to provide financial support to their children. In fact, 
many "deadbeat fathers" will fall into the first class of 
fathers because their paternity is often adjudicated in a 
child support proceedings. If anything, the third class of 
fathers would seem the most likely to provide financial 
support, since these fathers have voluntarily filed a sworn 
affidavit with the court agreeing to an order against them 
for child support and medical expenses. There is no 
rational reason why these particular fathers should be 
forced to go one step further and prove that they have paid 
pregnancy and birth-related expenses (within 24 hours of 
the child's birth) — or lose their child forever. 
Moreover, the classification simply does not bear a 
rational relationship to the state's professed goals. 
First, the classification does not assure that adoptions 
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will be finalized promptly, or that adoptive placements 
will not be disturbed. In fact, it virtually assures the 
opposite. In every instance where the finality of an 
adoption turns on the provision set forth in Section 78-30-
4.14(2)(b)(iii), an evidentiary hearing will be required to 
determine the amount of the pregnancy and birth-related 
expenses, whether the biological father paid his fair share 
within his means, and whether the person having custody of 
the child prevented the father from paying those expenses. 
Inevitable litigation of this issue will cause, not 
prevent, delays in the finality of adoption proceedings. 
In sum, the state's asserted goal is simply not advanced by 
the differential treatment of these classes of biological 
fathers. Because Section 78-30-4.14 (2) (b) (iii) arbitrarily 
discriminates against one class of biological it violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 
II. Section 78-30-4.14(2) (b) (iii) is Unconstitutionally 
Vague. 
11
 [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing 
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential part of due 
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process of law." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 
U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the vagueness 
doctrine applies to civil as well as criminal statutes. See 
A.B. Small Company v. American Sugar Refining Company, 2 67 
U.S. 233, 239 (1925). The degree of vagueness that is 
constitutionally permissible, depends in part on the nature 
of the statute in question. For example, economic 
regulations are subject to a less strict vagueness test and 
courts have permitted greater tolerance of enactments with 
civil penalties "because the consequences of imprecision 
are qualitatively less severe." Hoffman Estates" v. 
Flipside, 455 U.S. at 498-99 (1982). 
Section 78-30-4.14(2) (b) (iii) operates to deprive a 
biological father of his "opportunity interest to develop a 
relationship with his biological children . . . a liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
Thus, although the adoption statute at issue is civil and 
not criminal, the consequences of imprecision in the 
statute are severe indeed. A father who is forced to guess 
at the meaning of the statute, and guesses wrong, is cut 
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off forever from his biological offspring. Accordingly, the 
statute must clearly be held to a high standard of clarity. 
In the instant case, Utah's adoption statute required 
Hartwig to "pay a fair and reasonable amount of the 
expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy 
and the child's birth." Hartwig was required to comply with 
this provision by 24 hours after the baby's birth (because 
this is when the mother executed her consent) . The statute 
does not specify whether "payment of expenses incurred" 
includes reimbursement of expenses paid by insurance 
companies or state agencies. The statute also does not 
specify whether "expenses" refers to medical expenses only, 
or if it refers to expenditures in general such as baby 
clothes or diapers, or if includes the mother's living 
expenses during the pregnancy. Furthermore, the statute 
does not provide any instructions as to how the expenses 
are to be paid when the father has not been informed of the 
actual expenses. 
Hartwig did not construe this provision to mean that 
he was required to pay cash to the mother during her 
pregnancy, or to make payments to medical providers absent 
any evidence of the actual expenses incurred. He instead 
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construed the statute to mean that he should pay his share 
of expenses, once such expenses were incurred and made 
known to him. Thus, he made it known to the health care 
providers that he was the financially responsible party, 
and requested in writing that medical bills be sent to him. 
He also construed the provision to mean that, since he knew 
the medical expenses were being paid by Medicaid, he should 
register himself with the Office of Recovery Services so 
that he could be billed for reimbursement once the expenses 
were calculated. He further construed the statute to mean 
that he should make expenditures for his baby's benefit, 
which he did. He purchased clothing, baby supplies, and 
furniture to be used by the baby after his birth. 
If Hartwig's interpretation of the requirements of 
Section 78-30-4.14(B) (2) (iii) was wrong, then the language 
of that provision simply does not provide clear 
instructions as to what is required of a biological father 
under these circumstances. Because of the lack of clarity 
in the provision, men of common intelligence would have to 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 
Where the statute operates to deprive biological fathers of 
the opportunity to have a relationship with their 
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biological children, it clearly violates "the first 
essential part of due process of law." Connally v. General 
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
III. Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii) as Applied to Hartwig 
Violates the Due Process Clauses of the Utah and 
United States Constitutions. 
Section 4.14(2) (b) (iii) violates the Due Process 
Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions because 
the provision mandates the termination of Hartwig1s 
parental rights even though Hartwig made substantial 
efforts to assume financial and legal responsibility for 
his child. 
a. Due Process Under the Federal Constitution 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. See Lehr 
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983). In Lehr, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state 
provision preventing fathers from contesting the adoption 
of their children unless they had registered with a 
putative fathers registry. Id. 
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The Lehr court held that "[w]hen an unwed father 
demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing 
of his child, his interest in personal contact with his 
child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process 
Clause." The Court noted that "the significance of the 
biological connection is that it offers the natural father 
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a 
relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that 
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for 
the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the 
parent-child relationship." Id. at 262. In upholding the 
paternity registration, the Lehr court noted that a 
provision preventing fathers from contesting the adoption 
of their children might violate the due process clause if 
the provision "[excluded] many responsible fathers, or if 
qualifications [for preserving parental right] was beyond 
the control of an interested putative father." Id. 
Section 78-30-4.14 (2) (b) (iii), like the statute at 
issue in Lehr, denies certain biological fathers, those who 
have not paid pregnancy and birth-related expenses by the 
time the mother executes her consent, the right to object 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the adoption proceedings of their children. But unlike 
the statute in Lehr, Section 78-30-4.14(2) (b) (iii) violates 
the Due Process Clause as applied to Hartwig because it 
operates to terminate his parental rights in spite of his 
reasonable efforts to assume legal and financial 
responsibility for the child. 
First, it should be noted that the latest date upon 
which Hartwig could have complied with the provisions of 
Section 78-30-4.14, including the provision requiring him 
to pay his share of expenses, was 24 hours after his son's 
birth. Section 4.14 provides that the "biological father 
must comply with all of the given provisions prior to the 
time the mother executes her consent for adoption." In this 
case, Vedadi executed her consent to the adoption the day 
after the infant's birth. 
Furthermore, the mother in this case was receiving 
Medicaid for her other two children when she became 
pregnant with Hartwig's son. (R. 451 at pages 190-191). 
Hartwig was unable to secure medical insurance through his 
employer, and shortly after Vedadi became pregnant, her 
Medicaid benefits were extended to include medical coverage 
for herself and her unborn child. (R. 451 at 190-191) . 
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Vedadi testified that she paid for the first few doctor's 
visits out of pocket, and that all remaining expenses were 
paid by Medicaid. (R. 451 at 174-175). 
Additionally, there was no contact between the parties 
from October of 1998 until the baby's birth. Hartwig 
asserts that he tried to contact Vedadi to inquire about 
the pregnancy and Vedadifs needs with relation to the 
pregnancy. Although Vedadi denied as much, she did admit 
that at the very least she received several telephone 
messages from Hartwig, which she did not return. (R. 451 
at p. 183) . She also testified that in October of 1998, 
she expressed to Hartwig that she did not wish to hear 
from him again and that she would not be returning his 
calls. (R. 451 at p. 184). Thus, the parties were no longer 
in communication after October of 1998, and Vedadi did not 
reveal to Hartwig what expenses if any she had incurred as 
a result of her pregnancy. 
In an effort to take financial responsibility for the 
medical expenses of Vedadi's pregnancy and the birth of his 
child, Hartwig did two things prior to the birth of the 
child: First, in October of 1998, three months before the 
baby was born, he registered himself as the father of the 
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unborn child with the Department of Recovery Services, the 
agency he understood to be responsible for obtaining 
reimbursement of Medicaid benefits. Second, in January of 
1998, one month before the birth of his child, he sent 
letters to Vedadifs health care providers naming himself as 
the party responsible for the medical expenses and asking 
that the medical bills be sent directly to him. 
During the pregnancy and after the baby's birth, 
Hartwig purchased clothing, baby supplies, and furniture 
for his child who he assumed would be living with him since 
Vedadi had stated that she did not plan to keep the child. 
After the birth of the child, Hartwig did several 
additional things in an effort to take financial 
responsibility for the expenses of Vedadifs pregnancy and 
the birth of his child. First, he sent letters via counsel 
to the adoptive parents, asking for confirmation of birth 
related expenses so that he could provide reimbursement of 
the same. Second, he sent a check for $1,000.00 to the 
adoptive parents to cover his share of out-of-pocket 
medical expenses pending receipt of some confirmation of 
additional expenses. To date, Hartwig still has not 
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received any confirmation of expenses relating to Vedadi!s 
pregnancy and the birth of his child. 
Under these circumstances, it was virtually impossible 
for Hartwig to pay his share of the pregnancy and birth-
related expenses within 24 hours of the baby's birth. 
Nevertheless, Hartwig made every effort to take financial 
responsibility for his child. Since Section 78-30-
4.14(2) (b) (iii) operates to terminate Hartwig1s parental 
rights - although he has "demonstrated a full commitment to 
the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to 
participate in the rearing of his child" - the provision 
clearly violates basic notions of due process guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
b. Utah Constitution 
In Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that, under Art. 1, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, legislation which 
infringes on parental rights (1) must be based on a 
compelling state interest in the result to be achieved, and 
(2) the means adopted must be narrowly tailored to achieve 
that purpose. The Wells court upheld the "paternity 
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registration requirement" of Utah's Adoption Statute, and 
explained that f,[t]he state has a compelling interest in 
speedily identifying those persons who will assume a 
parental role over newborn illegitimate children." Id. The 
court held that the "registration requirement" was narrowly 
tailored to the state's compelling interest because there 
"was no infringement of the unwed father's rights not 
essential to the state's purposes." Id. at 207. 
Section 78-30-4.14 (2) (b) (iii)operates to terminate the 
parental rights of biological fathers who have not paid 
their share of pregnancy and birth-related expenses before 
the biological mother executes her consent (which she can 
do 24 hours after the birth) . As argued above, this 
provision is not even substantially related to the state's 
purported interests (and much less "narrowly tailored"). 
The requirements contained in 78-30-4.14 (2) (b) (iii) simply 
do not advance the goals asserted by the state. The 
requirement that unwed biological fathers prove that they 
have paid pregnancy and birth-related expenses before they 
can contest the adoption of their children does not assure 
that adoptions will be finalized promptly, or that adoptive 
placements will not be disturbed. In fact, it virtually 
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assures the opposite. Inevitable litigation of this issue 
will cause, not prevent, delays in the finality of adoption 
proceedings. In sum, the requirement contained in Section 
78-30-4.14 (2) (b) (iii) is not narrowly tailored to a 
compelling government interest, and thus violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Utah Constitution. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling That Hartwig Did Not 
Comply with Utah Code Ann. Section 78-30-4.14 (iii). 
Section 78-30-4 .14 (iii) of the U^ah Code requires that 
a father who wishes to oppose the adoption of his newborn 
child must " [pay] a fair and reasonable amount of the 
expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy 
and the child's birth, in accordance with his means, and 
when not prevented from doing so by the person or 
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child." 
Vedadi testified she paid approximately $200.00 in out-
of-pocket costs relating to her pregnancy, including 
medical expenses which were not covered by Medicaid 
(although she provided no receipts for such payments). The 
trial court found that Hartwig spent approximately $75.00 
on maternity clothing for Vedadi and diapers for the baby. 
4? 
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(R. 300).4 Hartwig also spent at least several hundred 
dollars for furniture, diapers, clothing, and supplies for 
the baby, but the trial court found that these expenditures 
didn't "count" because the purchased items were kept at 
Hartwig's apartment rather than given to Vedadi. (R. 300). 
The trial court's ruling in this regard was clearly 
erroneous because there is no rational reason why diapers 
purchased for the baby and stored at Vedadi's house should 
be "counted," while diapers, clothing, furniture, and 
supplies purchased for the baby and kept at Hartwig's house 
should not be counted. They were expenditures made for the 
baby in both instances, and if such expenditures "count" 
for the purposes of Section 78-30-4.14(iii) , they should 
clearly count in either instance. Based on the total 
expenditures made by Vedadi and Hartwig, Hartwig clearly 
paid his share of the overall out-of-pocket expenditures. 
With regard to pregnancy and birth-related medical 
expenses, the only medical expenses actually "incurred" at 
the time of the baby's birth was approximately $100.00 paid 
4
 The trial court found that Hartwig requested that Vedadi 
return these things to him when they broke up. The court's 
finding in this regard was clearly erroneous. Vedadi 
testified that she returned the items only because Hartwig 
said something "strange" about having receipts to show that 
he had purchased them for her. (R. 451 at p. 161:16-25). 
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out-of-pocket by Vedadi for two office visits. (R. 451 at 
p. 174:4-25). No evidence was presented regarding any other 
medical expenses actually "incurred" (i.e. actually billed 
or invoiced) before the baby was relinquished for adoption. 
Furthermore, Hartwig testified that he believed the 
medical expenses were covered by Medicaid, and that he 
would be required to repay those expenses later. (R. 451 
at p. 60:8-16). He also testified that Vedadi was not 
required to make any payment when they attended a doctor's 
appointment early in the pregnancy, (R. 451 at p. 78:7-
16), and that he was not aware of Vedadi receiving any 
bills for medical services. (R. 451 at p. 60:13-16). No 
evidence was presented at trial which would contradict 
Hartwig's testimony in this regard. Thus, if such 
expenditures were indeed made by Vedadi, she did not 
provide information about the expenditures to Hartwig and 
accordingly made it impossible for him to reimburse her for 
those.5 Subsection (iii) of the statute provides that a 
5
 The statute should be reasonably interpreted to require 
the party incurring the expense to inform the other party 
of the expense so as to provide a reasonable opportunity 
for reimbursement or payment. See e.g. Curtis v. Harmon 
Electronics, 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978) ("A statute is 
presumed not to be intended to produce absurd consequences 
and . . . where it is possible . . . will be given a 
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father must pay expenses "when not prevented from doing so 
by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of 
the child." Failure to provide information regarding 
expenses clearly operates to prevent reimbursement or 
payment of such expenses. 
Finally, the trial court erred in faulting Hartwig for 
not providing medical insurance for Vedadi. Hartwig 
testified that he did not even have medical insurance for 
himself when Vedadi became pregnant, and that he attempted 
to, but could not, obtain medical insurance for Vedadi 
after finding out that she was pregnant. Since Hartwig 
could not obtain medical insurance for Vedadi, he 
registered himself as the responsible party with the Office 
of Recovery Services and sent letters to the providers 
naming himself as the responsible party and requesting that 
he be billed for the medical expenses. 
In sum, Hartwig complied with Section 78-30-4.14(iii) 
by making substantial expenditures for the baby's benefit, 
and by naming himself as the responsible party with 
reasonable and sensible construction.") Clearly, it would 
be unreasonable to require a party to reimburse, or pay a 
certain share of, expenses that the party has not been made 
aware of, and all the more so where the party's parental 
rights turn on payment of such expenses. 
45 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Recovery Services and private medical providers, and by 
requesting that he be billed for medical expenses. If 
Hartwig did not comply v/ith regards to the $100.00 paid by 
Vedadi, he was prevented from doing so by Vedadi's refusal 
to communicate with Hartwig, and her failure to inform 
Hartwig of expenses paid by her. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 78-30-4 .14 (2) (iii)the Utah Code operated to 
deprive him of his parental rights in violation of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Utah and United 
States Constitution, where Scott Hartwig made his identity 
known and objectively manifested a significant paternal 
interest in his child prior the child's birth. Accordingly, 
Hartwig respectfully requests that the order of the trial 
court be reversed, and that the matter be remanded to the 
trial court for custody proceedings. 
Dated this Q- °i day of December, 2000. 
SHARON PRESTON 
Attorney for Scott Hartwig 
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LEXSTAT U.C.A. 78-30-4.12 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2000 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2000 UT 35 AND 2000 UT APP 86 *** 
*** (2000 GENERAL SESSION) *** 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 30. ADOPTION 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12 (2000) 
§ 78-30-4.12. Rights and responsibilities of parties in adoption proceedings 
(1) The Legislature finds that the rights and interests of all parties 
affected by an adoption proceeding must be considered and balanced in 
determining what constitutional protections and processes are necessary and 
appropriate. 
(2) The Legislature finds that: 
(a) the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent 
homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of 
adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of 
children; 
(b) an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial 
decisions about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and has 
the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future and the 
future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding the permanence of an 
adoptive placement; 
(c) adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive 
placements; 
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy 
interest in retaining custody of an adopted child; and 
(e) an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires 
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment 
to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the 
child's birth. The state has a compelling interest in requiring unmarried 
biological fathers to demonstrate that commitment by providing appropriate 
medical care and financial support and by establishing legal paternity, in 
accordance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(3) (a) In enacting Sections 78-30-4.11 through 78-30-4.21, the Legislature 
prescribes the conditions for determining whether an unmarried biological 
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father's action is sufficiently prompt and substantial to require constitutional 
protection. 
(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the opportunities to 
establish a relationship with his child that are available to him, his 
biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in 
constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by his 
failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate it. 
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the 
state's compelling interest. The Legislature finds that the interests of the 
state, the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents described in this section 
outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological father who does not timely 
grasp the opportunity to establish and demonstrate a relationship with his child 
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(d) An unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility to 
protect his rights. 
(e) An unmarried biological father is presumed to know that the child may 
be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the provisions 
of this chapter, manifests a prompt and full commitment to his parental 
responsibilities, and establishes paternity. 
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right of privacy 
with regard to her pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal 
obligation to disclose the identity of an unmarried biological father prior to 
or during an adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to volunteer information 
to the court with respect to the father. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-30-4.12, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 168, § 2. 
NOTES: 
EFFECTIVE DATES. —Laws 1995, ch. 168 became effective on May 1, 1995, pursuant 
to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
CONSTRUCTION. 
Sections 62A-4a-201 and 78-30-4.12 are complementary: once an unmarried 
father has taken the required steps to establish paternity and preserve his 
rights of notice and consent as required by the Adoption Act, he may become 
eligible for the parental rights afforded under the Child Welfare Reform Act. 
C.F. v. D.D., 1999 UT 10, 984 P.2d 961. 
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LEXSTAT U.C.A. 78-30-4.14 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2000 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2000 UT 35 AND 2000 UT APP 86 *** 
*** (2000 GENERAL SESSION) *** 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 30. ADOPTION 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14 (2000) 
§ 78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relinquishment for adoption 
(1) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed child-placing agency or 
consent to adoption is required from: 
(a) the adoptee, if he is more than 12 years of age, unless he does not 
have the mental capacity to consent; 
(b) both parents or the surviving parent of an adoptee who was conceived 
or born within a marriage, unless the adoptee is 18 years of age or older; 
(c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage; 
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to be the child's 
biological father by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the motherfs 
execution of consent or her relinquishment to an agency for adoption; 
(e) any biological parent who has executed a voluntary declaration of 
paternity in accordance with Title 78, Chapter 45e, prior to the mother's 
execution of consent or her relinquishment to an agency for adoption; 
(f) an unmarried biological father of an adoptee, as defined in Section 
78-30-4.11, only if the requirements and conditions of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) 
have been proven; and 
(g) the licensed child-placing agency to whom an adoptee has been 
relinquished and that is placing the child for adoption. 
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an unmarried biological 
father is necessary only if the father has strictly complied with the 
requirements of this section. 
(a) (i) With regard to a child who is placed with adoptive parents more 
than six months after birth, an unmarried biological father shall have developed 
a substantial relationship with the child, taken some measure of responsibility 
for the child and the child's future, and demonstrated a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by financial support of the child, of a fair and 
reasonable sum and in accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented 
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from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the 
child, and either: 
(A) visiting the child at least monthly when physically and 
financially able to do so, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or 
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child; or 
(B) regular communication with the child or with the person or 
agency having the care or custody of the child, when physically and financially 
unable to visit the child, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or 
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. 
(ii) The subjective intent of an unmarried biological father, whether 
expressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this 
subsection shall not preclude a determination that the father failed to meet the 
requirements of this subsection. 
(iii) An unmarried biological father who openly lived with the child 
for a period of six months within the one-year period after the birth of the 
child and immediately preceding placement of the child with adoptive parents, 
and openly held himself out to be the father of the child during that period, 
shall be deemed to have developed a substantial relationship with the child and 
to have otherwise met the requirements of this subsection. 
(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the time he 
is placed with adoptive parents, an unmarried biological father shall have 
manifested a full commitment to his parental responsibilities by performing all 
of the acts described in this subsection prior to the time the mother executes 
her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing 
agency. The father shall: 
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 
45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, and file with that court a sworn affidavit 
stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the child, 
setting forth his plans for care of the child, and agreeing to a court order of 
child support and the payment of expenses incurred in connection with the 
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth; 
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the 
state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in a 
confidential registry established by the department for that purpose; and 
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair and 
reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the motherfs 
pregnancy and the child's birth, in accordance with his means, and when not 
prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody 
of the child. 
(3) An unmarried biological father whose consent is required under Subsection 
(1) or (2) may nevertheless lose his right to consent if the court determines, 
in accordance with the requirements and procedures of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 
4, Termination of Parental Rights Act, that his rights should be terminated, 
based on the petition of any interested party. 
(4) If there is no showing that an unmarried biological father has consented 
to or waived his rights regarding a proposed adoption, the petitioner shall file 
with the court a certificate from the state registrar of vital statistics within 
the Department of Health, stating that a diligent search has been made of the 
registry of notices from unmarried biological fathers described in Subsection 
(2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has been found pertaining to the father of the 
child in question, or if a filing is found, stating the name of the putative 
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father and the time and date of filing. That certificate shall be filed with the 
court prior to entrance of a final decree of adoption. 
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply 
with each of the conditions provided in this section, is deemed to have waived 
and surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to 
notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, 
and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-30-4.14, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 168, § 4. 
NOTES: 
EFFECTIVE DATES. —Laws 1995, ch. 168 became effective on May 1, 1995, pursuant 
to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENTS 
AMENDMENT 14 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
USCS Const. Amend. 14, § 1 (2000) 
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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2 of 13 DOCUMENTS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
one of the LEXIS Publishing companies. 
All rights reserved. 
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2000 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS THROUGH 2000 UT 35 AND 2000 UT APP 86 *** 
*** (2000 GENERAL SESSION) *** 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 (2000) 
§ 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
HISTORY: Const. 1896. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENTS 
AMENDMENT 5 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
USCS Const. Amend. 5 (2000) 
THE CASE NOTES SEGMENT OF THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SPLIT INTO 4 DOCUMENTS. 
THIS IS PART 4. 
USE THE BROWSE FEATURE TO REVIEW THE OTHER PART(S). 
Criminal actions—Provisions concerning—Due process of law and just 
compensation clauses. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time 
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
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By. 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 S 1999 
SALTJLA^E COUNTY 
I / 
v
 ' Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In re the Adoption of: 
Baby Boy Vedadi, 2-14-99 
SCOTT ALLEN HARTWIG, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
WENDY VEDADI, aka LIND8EY, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 990900018 
The above-entitled cause came on for hearing on June 23, 1999, 
with Sharon Preston appearing as attorney for petitioner, Scott 
Allen Hartwig, and Gary Bell appearing as attorney for respondent, 
Wendy Vedadi, arfd Candice Ragsdale-Pollock appearing as attorney 
for Marc Greeley and Genevieve Greeley, adoption petitioners. 
The hearing was held for the purpose of determining whether 
Scott Allen Hartwig (hereinafter "Hartwig") complied with the 
provisions of Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii), thus making his 
consent necessary for the adoption of Baby Boy Vedadi, pursuant to 
the Order in this matter dated June 23, 1999. 
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently complied with the 
provisions of Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii), thus making his 
consent necessary for the adoption. Respondent and adoption 
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VEDADI ADOPTION PAGE TWO FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
petitioners argue that petitioner did not in fact comply with the 
relevant provisions and hence the consent of petitioner is not 
required for the adoption. 
After hearing the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and 
being fully advised, the Court makes and enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Hartwig is the biological father of Baby Boy Vedadi. 
2. That on June 25, 1998, Hartwig learned that Wendy Vedadi 
(hereinafter "Vedadi11) was pregnant with his child. 
3. That during July 1998, Hartwig was told by Vedadi of the 
potential placement of her unborn child for adoption. 
4. That during the entire pregnancy of Vedadi, Hartwig 
maintained a separate residence. 
5. That Vedadi lived at the same residence from the 
beginning of her pregnancy until approximately February 2, 1998, at 
which time she moved. 
6. That Hartwig had knowledge of Vedadi9s whereabouts from 
the beginning of her pregnancy until approximately February 2, 
1998, 12 days before Baby Boy Vedadi was born. 
nnQm 
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VEDADI ADOPTION PAGE THREE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
7. That Hartvlg knew the name and address of Vedadi's 
attending physician and he attended one of Vedadi's regularly 
scheduled office visits during her pregnancy. 
8. That during July 1998, Vedadi invited Hartwig to 
participate in the insurance coverage and medical expenses for her 
pregnancy and the birth of Baby Boy Vedadi. 
9. That during July 1998, Vedadi told Hartwig that if he 
refused to participate in the medical expenses of her pregnancy 
that she would be forced to obtain insurance coverage through 
Medicaid. 
10. That during the entire pregnancy, Hartwig failed to 
participate or otherwise provide any insurance coverage and also 
failed to participate in or pay any amounts whatsoever for any 
medical expenses relating to Vedadi's pregnancy and the birth of 
Baby Boy Vedadi. 
11. As a result of Hartwig 9s failure to participate or 
provide insurance coverage and/or his failure to participate in or 
provide payment for medical expenses for the pregnancy and the 
birth of Baby Boy Vedadi, Vedadi was forced to obtain such 
insurance coverage through Medicaid. 
12. That because Vedadi's pregnancy was high risk, she was 
required to see her doctor once per week for the first two months 
nnino 
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VEDADI ADOPTION PAGE FOUR FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
of her pregnancy and then once every other week for the remainder 
of her pregnancy. 
13. That from June 25, 1998 up to and including the hearing 
of this matter on June 23, 1999, Vedadi did not preclude or prevent 
Hartwig from performing his financial obligations as required by 
Utah law. 
14. That from September 1998 through January 1999, Hartwig 
provided no financial support for Vedadi or Baby Boy Vedadi, nor 
did he make any payment for pregnancy or birth expenses. 
15. That from February 1998 through August 1998, Hartwig 
purchased and/or gave Vedadi the following: 
a. One spandex jumper for Vedadi, costing $18. 
b. One pair of overalls purchased from Deseret 
Industries, for Vedadi, costing $5. 
c. One trenchcoat purchased from Deseret Industries 
for Vedadi, costing $7. 
d. One bottle of prenatal vitamins, costing $18. 
e. One package of disposable diapers, costing less 
than $25. 
f. One tube of Desitin diaper rash ointment, costing 
$2-
00303 
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VEDADI ADOPTION PAGE FIVE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
g. One Hundred Dollars ($100) for the registration of 
Brandon Lindsey, Vedadi9s son, for soccer. 
h. Thirty Dollars ($30) as a loan to Wendy Vedadi to 
pay for child care expenses for her younger 
daughter, Hope. 
16. That in July 1998, at the request of Hartwig, Vedadi 
returned each item described in paragraph 11 to Hartwig, with the 
exception of the $100 for soccer registration and the $30 loan. 
17. While Hartwig claims to have made various additional cash 
payments to Vedadi, Vedadi denies having received any such 
additional funds whatsoever. Hartwig has no receipts, 
documentation, or any corroboration whatsoever with respect to the 
alleged payments, and based upon the Court's assessment of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the totality of the evidence, it 
is the judgment and finding of the Court that Hartwig has failed to 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any additional 
payments were in fact made. 
18. That it is questionable at best whether or not a $30 loan 
or a $100 gift for a different purpose qualify as payment for 
expenses incurred with pregnancy and birth. Assuming arguendo, 
however, that those expenditures are payment for pregnancy related 
nnir\A 
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VEDADI ADOPTION PAGE SIX FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
expenses they, together with the purchase of the other items set 
forth in paragraph 15, constitute only token contributions. 
19. Hartwig claims that he has acquired, for himself and at 
his residence, certain furniture and other items which he asserts 
may be utilized by him in caring for the infant child. None of 
these items, however, were offered to or in any way made available 
to Vedadi. While Hartwig9s actions in acquiring some child care 
items may demonstrate a bona fide subjective intent to establish 
parental rights, these actions do not constitute payment of fair 
and reasonable expenses incurred with the pregnancy or birth. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Hartwig failed to strictly comply with the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-30-4.14(2)(iii). 
2. That based on the failure of Hartwig to strictly comply 
with the provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-30-4.14, his 
nmne; 
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c o n s e n t if. n.il i uqu J i >.:i.l in I hr I I I . IMI I nl In r e : A d o p t i o n o t Baby 
i w i w n l ' 
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VEDADI ADOPTION PAGE EIGHT FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
I hereby certify tha mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings i • I i in i isions I i > > 
i owing, this jC? / day of June, 1999: ? 
Sharon Preston 
Attorney for Petitioner 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gary Bell 
Attorney for Respondent 
254 West 400 South, Suite J.,1" 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Candice Ragsdale-Pollock 
Attorney for Marc & Genevieve Greeley 
254 West 400 South, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
O 3 '^ • ... -
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Attorney for Petitioner 
:r 3 00 ;: ruth, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Te1ephonei (80 ] ) 36 6-4592 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 2 3 1999 
SALT LAKfefcoUNTY 
Deputy Clerk" 
V 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT? " STATE OF UI "A \ I I 
In Re Adoption of 
x:± Boy Vedadi, 2-14 99, 
h(Xn !'" ALLEN HARTWIG, 
Pet 
' s 
I L l C 
WEND Y VEDADI 
aka WENDY LINDSEI , 
Respondent , 
) 
jRDER REGARDING TIME FOR 
COMPLIANCE UNDER UTAH CODE 
i
 MMm §78-30-4.14(2) (b) 
C i v i l No, 99 -0900018 
Tudge L i v i n g s t o n 
A h e a r i n g was h e l d b e f o r e Judge L i v i n g s t o n on May 28 , iQQ't")
 (lt: 
I nil! io i I lie p u r p o s e of d e c i d i n g t h e l a t e s t p o s s i b l e d a t e upon 
wh ich S c o t t Har ts rnmp i ii'i'iii1 I ii 1 in i IK-'1 p r o v i s i o n s of 
S e c t i o n 78-30 4 14 (2) (b) of t h e Utah Code, t h u s making h i s c o n s e n t 
JIJPI e s s d i \r I oi I il 1* a d o p t i o n ol h i s son Baby Boy V e d a d i . Counsel for 
Wendy Vedad i , Mail. u\ I i!rih< n< i ^ tee- lp) JIHII IwoLt Hart wig were 
p r e s e n t , and made a r g u m e n t s Lo t h e cou i t . The c o u r t h a v m q h -^n» d 
a r g u m e n t s oi. c o u n s e l , HEREBY ORDERS 
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1. . Scott Hartwig was required to comply with Section 78-30-
* 4 *t- the 
latest, lliiu being the date upon which the mother 
properly executed her consent to the adopt Lor 
Root I: Harts « in i"i i 'ompi J tn; . euLion U • „ I llvi I i I 
b> finng a Complaint for Paternity on January "'"i l " -MI, 
n
 Scott Hartwig complied with Section - *_ •• ^
 m_, %_, v _ j 
li'i1 I ilni'i .J Notice of. Commencement of Paternity Action 
w i t h t h e Depar t iT iP i i l n | He a I I I i ll.jiijijd i y . ' S , III1 "i 
Willi regards to Section 78-30 4.14 UJ lb) (in I , Scott 
Hartwig was required to comply with this provision, not. 
b y mi [ifii't; j c ' n J a n r n i l f I mid! v Iiiiijii n l i j ouyh i i j u i i he 
pregnancy beginning with the date he became awaie of the 
pregnancy, that date being June 25, 1998. 
5 . i 'i (-Wit 1 p y hc-'ci1 i no i i cj .|ii i ' MI i in iii[ f-'UTiii" « /ih( \ h e r 
Scott Hartwig in fact complied with Section 78-30-4.14 
( I lb) (in) , 
DATED thisrV0 
BY THE CO" 
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MAILING CERTIFT GATE 
... 4~ 
I hereby certify that on this . -~7 wi June, 1999, I 
deposited a ropy of i tie ioregoing Order " - *"u~ V S Mail, postage 
prepaid, and addv^ r.s'-"-' 
Candice Ragsdale-Pollack 
Attorney for Mark L Genevieve Greeley 
254 West 400 South, Suite 320 
Salt: Lake City, "• . -I 84401 
Gary Bell 
Attorney for Wendy Vedadi 
254 West 400 South, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84401 
f"—*' /'I 
3 i in:'!)!) 
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I ) 
Order Dat^d ' ; , i \ ] r f ." , J°9 
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i.t. . t . rfell(#6485) 
254 West 400 South, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)532-0872 
Facsimile: (801)359-6873 
Attorney for Respondent 
W e n d y Vedadi 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATF OF UTAH 
I N R E T H E A D O P T I O N OF: 
O R D E R 
H O P E K N E I G H L I S A L I M I S P > 4 / 1 3 / 9 / * 
B A B Y B O Y V E D A D I , 2/14/99 * 
Minor(s). 
S C O T T H A R T W I G , 
Petitioner, 
v. 
U'FKwut v E D A l i i , 
Respondent. 
... aDove-entitled matter came on for hearing on June 23, 1999, before the Honorable 
Livingston .dy Vedadi, appeared in person and 
was represented by Gary L. Bell. The Petitioners/Adoptive Parents, Marc & Gene 
were represented by Candice Ragsdale-Pollock. The Petitioner/Natural 
Father, Scott Hartwig, appeared in person aii I • viis rcprcsenli I Ibi, Nkumi I Prestoi « - M^m 
Warren Jr. appeared as a volunteer Guardian Ad Litem. The Court, having heard argumer 
nnnsv iiiui On |MH" > c nience in support of their pleadings, having reviewed the file in this 
n n o o o 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 1! 3 1993 
SAIT LAKE COUNTi 
IBy- ._.„„ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ * - J f c d L ; 
Dopi.it v rifirK 
Judge Roger A. Livingston 
* 
* 
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I'H'i'.'r h.'ivnij.' It in ivi and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and being 
otherwise fuliy advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Si on H.irlwig diilcd Lu MI icily comply with the provisions of the State of Utah's 
Adoption Act found in, U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(2)(b)(iii). 
2. Based on Scott Hartwig's failure to strictly comply with those provisions, Scott 
Hartwig's consul «' M«»t requirnl in llu. nunc o' '«* AV Adoption o) Baby Boy I edadi and that 
matter may proceed. 
DA H: I) mis Jjy day of fj^i* I , 1999. 
BYTHECollRI 
J. 
The Honorable RBj&LX. Livingston 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
fHi:t:.?4 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certirv dial on Uus/9,*day ofJtffyT 1999,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be .;:_ c: 
Sharon L. Preston, Esq. 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City ,UT 84101 
Candice Ragsdale-Pollock 
254 West 400 South, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Barton J. Warren, Jr. 
352 Denver Street, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM E 
Complaint for Pa te rn i ty 
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Third Judicial District 
Sharon L. Preston (#7960) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 366-4592 
JAN 2 0 1999 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT ALLEN HARTWIG, ] 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ] 
WENDY VEDADI ] 
aka WENDY LINDSEY, ; 
Respondent. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR 
) PATERNITY AND CHILD CUSTODY 
Civil No. ^ 4 1 0 0 - ^ 4 
1 Judge r<i-e&exci^  
[ -Jen-^ 4 __ 
Petitioner, through his attorney Sharon L. Preston, alleges 
as follows: 
1. Both Petitioner and Respondent are a bona fide residents 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for three months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent are the parents of an unborn 
minor child whose expected date of birth is February 2, 1999. 
3. Petitioner and Respondent are not married, but were 
engaged to be married and were involved in a sexual relationship 
during the several months preceding the conception of the parties' 
unborn child. 
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4. Petitioner should be named as the biological father of 
the parties' minor child in a Decree of Paternity. 
5. Petitioner should be awarded sole custody of the parties' 
minor child, subject to reasonable visitation by the Respondent, 
based upon the following: 
a. Respondent has expressed her intent to give the child up 
for adoption immediately after the child's birth. 
b. Petitioner has a strong interest in the child's well-
being, and is strongly desirous of providing financial 
support and a stable loving home to child. 
c. Petitioner is a fit and proper person to be awarded 
custody of the child because he has a good job, a nice 
home, and a responsible and stable lifestyle. 
d. Petitioner has made every effort to provide financial 
support to Respondent during her pregnancy, but 
Respondent has adamantly refused Petitioner's offers of 
financial support. Nevertheless, Petitioner has now made 
it known to the medical providers that he is the father 
of the unborn child and that he will be .responsible for 
his share of all related costs. 
2 
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e. Petitioner has purchased baby furniture, clothing, 
blankets, and other things needed for the baby's care, 
but Respondent has refused to accept these things and 
even returned some of them after she initially accepted 
them. 
5. Petitioner has executed and filed an affidavit consenting 
to a court order of child support and payment of expenses incurred 
during Respondent's pregnancy and the child's birth, as required by 
Section 78-30-4.14 of the Utah Code. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, Petitioner requests that he be awarded 
an order consistent with the terms set forth in this complaint. 
DATED this /$ day of January, 1999. 
•** J AvL ^*-^  
SHARON L. PRESTON 
Attorney at Law 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SCOTT ALLEN HARTWIG, having been first duly sworn upon 
oath, deposes and states: That he is the Petitioner in the above-
named Complaint for Paternity, and that the matters stated in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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foregoing Complaint are true and correct to the best of his 
knowledge, belief, and information. 
JrJhQk. P/^<MTT; 
Scott Allen Hartdwig 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this J2J2r day of January, 1999. 
•Sfftr-BT-n t)h/kUJj, CcMLL 
Sj* Uk. o^!mhurff' NOTARY PUBLIC 
**>'Cowntufen Emint I s
^*7**7,2001 | 
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ADDENDUM F 
Affidavit of Scott Hartwig in Support of 
Motion for Temporary Order 
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Sharon L. Preston (#7960) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 366-4592 
5 iccg-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT ALLEN HARTWIG, 
Petitioner, 
vs. ] 
WENDY VEDADI ] 
aka WENDY LINDSEY, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT HARTWIG 
1 IN SUPPORT OF 
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
1 Civil No. 99-4900384 
) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SCOTT ALLEN HARTWIG, having been first duly sworn upon 
oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am the biological father of an "BABY BOY VEDADI," who was 
born on February 14, 1999, and who has been placed for 
adoption by his mother. 
2. From the time I first found out about the pregnancy, I have 
consistently expressed my sincere interest in being involved 
in the child's life to the child's mother and to every one 
else in my life. (See attached Affidavits). 
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3. I am ready, willing, and able to assume custody of my son, and 
desire to do so immediately. I have made all of the necessary 
preparations for his arrival. I have checked into health 
insurance for him, I have asked for help from friends and 
family, I have received advice and guidance from other 
parents, and I have obtained everything necessary for his 
care. (See Attached Affidavits, plus Attachment A) . Most 
importantly my heart is filled with deep love and concern for 
my son. Ultimately, I believe it is in his best interest to be 
in the custody of his biological father who loves him and is 
committed to his well-being. 
4. The allegations made in Wendy's affidavit regarding my 
unfitness as a parent are completely false, as follows: 
a. I do not use drink alcohol excessively, or use drugs, 
both of which would be inconsistent with my stable 
employment history, my strong relationships with family 
and friends, and my interest and participation in sports. 
b. I have a very stable employment history, and have been an 
honest and dedicated employee of Garden Decor for almost 
six years. (See Attachment B). 
c. I have no criminal history and have never been violent 
towards anyone. (See Attachment C) . 
2 
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I had a stable upbringing in a good home, and have normal 
loving relationships with all of my family members.(See 
Affidavit of Carol Hartwig). 
It is absolutely not true that I have impregnated five 
other women. I have also never demanded that anyone get 
an abortion, and Wendy's claims that I have done so is 
inconsistent with her claims that I want a child at all 
costs for the purpose of appeasing my mother. 
In fact, my mother is excited and happy about the birth 
of her grandchild, and has offered her loving support, 
but she does not even live in Utah and it is simply 
untrue that my interest in my child is based solely on my 
desire to appease my mother. 
I had a loving relationship with all of Wendy's children, 
at least to the extent that Wendy allowed me to. I didn't 
want to start disciplining them as Wendy demanded, 
because I felt it was way too soon in my relationship 
with them to assume that kind of role. I played with the 
children a lot, and tried to give a little advice and 
guidance to them when I saw an opportunity to do so. I 
never left the children alone when they were in my care, 
nor was I ever intoxicated in their presence. (See 
3 
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Affidavits of Lennette Vigil, Sam Vigil, Kathy and Rick 
Medina). 
h. My friends are not drug users or gang members. In fact, 
I have a very strong circle of friends with whom I play 
softball. Most of them are married and have children, 
and all of them of decent, hardworking, honest 
people.(See Affidavits of Lennette Vigil, Sam Vigil, 
Kathy and Rick Medina). 
i. I do not devote myself to softball in a manner that would 
cause me to neglect loved ones or other responsibilities. 
In fact, because most of my friends have families, we all 
sit down together and plan our softball schedule so that 
it will not interfere with important family events. 
Also, my friends' wives and children come to the softball 
practices and games, and we all socialize together and 
the children play together. (See Affidavit of Dale and 
Andrea Ashton). 
At the time Wendy became pregnant, we were engaged to be 
married, and had decided to share our lives together. It was 
Wendy's decision to terminate out relationship, and not my 
irresponsibility or lack of commitment. 
I do not feel any kind of bitterness toward Wendy, and it is 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
untrue that my interest in my child is motivated by a desire 
to hurt Wendy. In fact, if I receive custody of our child, I 
hope that Wendy would want to participate in the child's life 
to some extent and I would encourage her to do so. 
7. I am truly sorry for the anxiety this matter must be causing 
to the prospective adoptive parents. I do not know if Wendy 
was forthright with prospective adoptive parents about my 
expression of interest in the child, but Wendy knew from the 
beginning that I was very interested in being a father to my 
child and that I would not consent to this adoption. The only 
reason I did not file papers earlier was because I did not 
know that Wendy intended to give the child up for adoption, 
and it was my belief that I could not file a paternity suit 
until afer the child's birth. 
8. In conclusion, I am ready and capable of assuming custody of 
my son, and I hope I will be able to do so right away in order 
to prevent any additional suffering to the prospective 
adoptive parents or to my son. 
^6 Scott Allen Hart\ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this Lfi day of March, 1999 
JENNIFER * LEI 
1204 E M 6286 Sou* 
Sandy. UMi MOM 
May 27- 2002 
STATE OF UTAH I 
1 
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ADDENDUM G 
Affidavit of Scott Hartwig in Support of 
Complaint for Paternity 
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Sharon L. Preston (#7960) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 366-4592 
FILED Dlf 11CT COURT 
Third Juaicia! District 
JAN^2 0 19pST 
SALT I 
By. V / Uc^ 
Oeputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT ALLEN HARTWIG, 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. , 
WENDY VEDADI ] 
aka WENDY LINDSEY, ] 
Respondent. 
' 
) AFFIDAVIT OF PUTATIVE FATHER 
) PURSUANT TO U.C.A. 78-30-4.14 
) Civil No. «H4^00^*4 
) Judge ^.eoa^cv 
> ±or*J» __ 
STATE OF UTAH 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SCOTT ALLEN HARTWIG, having been first duly sworn upon 
oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am the biological father of an unborn child whose expected 
date of birth is February 22, 1999. The mother of the child is 
Wendy Vedadi (nee Lindsey). 
2. The child's mother has expressed her intent of giving the 
child up for adoption as soon as it is born. 
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I desire to have full custody of the child, and I am capable 
of providing financial support, a stable and loving home, and 
most importantly, love and day-to-day care for the child. 
My plans for taking care of the child are as follows: 
a. The baby will live with me at my apartment located at 
4477 S. 300 W., Murray, Utah. 
b. I plan to take a leave-of-absence from my employment to 
care for the baby during the month or two after the 
birth. 
c. I will be the sole provider of the child's day-to-day 
care, such as bathing, feeding, diapers, etc. 
d. I will be taking the child to all medical check-ups and 
doctor's appointments. 
e. I have already purchased clothing, blankets, furniture, 
and other items needed to care for the baby. 
f. I have a close circle of friends, many of whom are 
parents of young children and infants, and these friends 
have offered to assist me with advice and babysitting, 
and to recommend a qualified daycare provider. 
g. I earn $13.50 an hour at my current employment and will 
be able to support the baby with my income, especially 
since I have no other dependents. 
2 
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5. I consent to a court order requiring me to pay child support 
or my share of expenses related to Respondent's pregnancy and 
the child's birth, as provided by law. 
6. I have offered to pay expenses related to Respondent's 
pregnancy and the child's birth, but Respondent has refused to 
allow me to do so, or to provide me with information regarding 
such expenses. I also purchased many items necessary for the 
baby's care (e.g. furniture, clothing, bottles, diapers, 
etc.), but Respondent either refused to accept or returned to 
me all of the items I had purchased. 
7. At this time, I have taken the additional step of contacting 
the University of Utah, and others who I believe may be 
providing medical care to the Respondent, to inform them that 
I am the father of the child and that I am willing to pay my 
share of the related expenses. (See Attachment A). 
* 5 'rfrfA* 
Scott Allen Haijcwig 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this I H^ day of January, 1999, 
Notary Pubic 
MICHELUS CARTER 
1370 E So. Ttmpfc Sto. 400 
Sa* Uka City. Utah 64111 
„ . ~_.-™ ,_, My Commisrion &$** * 
I \^ZZ>W Saptsmbar 7, 2001 
^ ^ m * ^ Stats of Utah 
»! \\ukkllh(jiJM, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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